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This paper proposes a model to explain the differences between outcomes of referenda and
the voting trends suggested by polls. Two main effects are at stake. First, the evolution of the
voters’ attitudes is conditional on the public information made available to them. Second, the
predisposition toward abstention among individuals within each voting group may be different.
Our model describes how these two aspects of decision making may interact, showing how
publicly available information may amplify the distinct tendency toward abstention between
both groups and thus affect the outcome of the referendum.
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1 Introduction
Voting is an intrinsic part of the modern concept of democracy and the desire to antecipate
the polling results is every bit as ancient as the very notion of ballot casting. Polls sample
information from the voting population to infer the dynamic evolution of the voters’ intention
until the date of the elections. On the one hand polls are important ingredients for political
strategists to center their efforts and resources in order to increase their share of votes. On the
other hand some political analysts fear that polls may influence the outcome of the process.
In many countries there are laws in place to prevent polling results from becoming publically
available close to the election days, reflecting this concern. Also, several analysts claim that
unexpected abstention may result from the perception of a clear winner based on polls, relaxing
the motivation of individuals to vote. The level of abstention may clearly impact polls’ ability
to predict the results of an election accurately.
We argue that although polls may accurately unveil the political preferences of the voters,
sometimess they do a poor job of predicting the voters’ willingness to vote on election day. And
yet, most of the time accuracy seems to be the dominant view; the Gallup polling organization,
for example, has often been accurate in predicting the outcome of U.S. Presidential elections
and the margin of victory for the election winner. However, it was off the mark in some close
elections, such as in 1948 (predicting the victory of Republican Dewey over Democrat Truman),
1976 (a victory for Republican Gerald Ford over Democrat Jimmy Carter), and 2000 (Democrat
Al Gore over Republican George W. Bush). In 1982 Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley lost the
California gubernatorial race despite being ahead in voter polls going into the elections.
Such errors are also observed outside the U.S. In the 1992 U.K. general election the final
opinion polls gave the Conservatives between 38% and 39% of the vote, about 1% behind the
Labour Party - suggesting that the election would produce a hung parliament or a narrow
Labour majority and end 13 years of Tory rule. In the final results, the Conservatives had
a lead of 7.6% over Labour and won their fourth successive general election. In Spain’s 2004
general elections the conservative PP was expected to maintain its parliamentary majority but
the Socialist PSOE secured 164 seats to the PP’s 148. In Portugal, a recent analysis of pre-
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election accuracy of polls (see Magalhaes, 2005) finds it comparable to that in other developed
countries, suggesting that errors are caused by either the closeness of elections or a shared
inability of pollsters to deal appropriately with the problems caused by low turnout (turnout
in national elections has fallen from 98% in 1975 to less than 50% in recent years).
This phenomenon applies not only to general elections but also to other voting processes,
such as referenda. In the recent past there have been a number of referenda in Portugal about
several different political and social issues. The first referendum about the legalization of
abortion was held in 1998 and a sequence of polls pointed out that the position in favor of
legalization would win (see Fig. 1). Among 11 different polls (including some associated with
the Catholic Church) during a period of two months, values ranged from 52% to 86% in favor
of legalization.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The surprising outcome of the referendum was a majority of valid votes (50.9%) against
the legalization. However, far less than 50% of the population voted - only 31.9% - making
the result legally non-binding. The experts argued that the repeated announcements of victory
from “yes camp” reinforced the abstention clustering among the part of the population in favor
of the legalization. On the contrary, people against legalization of abortion mobilized to vote.
Since the result was non-binding, a new referendum was called in 2007 (see Fig. 2). Although
in the first referendum the opinion makers for legalization had focused their efforts on the
discussion of the issue per se, in the second referendum their effort was complemented with a
strong appeal to participation in the voting process. In the second referendum 59.25% of the
valid votes were in favor and 40.75% were against, with a participation of 44% of voters, this
time confirming the polls.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In many of the cases described above, polling agents failed because absenteeism was consi-
derable. But why was absenteeism not an issue in the other instances? To answer this question,
we build a model assuming a feedback effect in the way polls influence results, and argue that
two main effects are at stake. First, the information made public is possibly insufficient to at-
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tain the optimal individual decision. By public information we understand both the perception
about the intentions of other voters, and also the information resulting from the public debate
about the different issues at stake in the voting process. In a general election, noise is clearly
generated by both, since public debate is spread across different topics. In the case of referenda,
however, there is only one issue at stake and noise affecting the individual decisions can onlya-
rise from the perception of voting intentions. In that sense, by applying our model to the case
of referenda, we assume that incomplete information prevents voters from incorporating the
expected abstention level in the update of their optimal voting decision, possibly preferring to
abstain when they should ideally vote, or preferring to vote when they should ideally abstain.
Second, there may be an asymmetric predisposition toward abstention among the individuals
willing to vote for each of the different possible outcomes. Given that such a predisposition
may be amplified by social interactions and the fact that the publicly available information of
polls is incomplete, there is an interaction of these two features of decision making, possibly
leading to stronger deviations from the forecast. This may lead not only to significant errors
in the winning margin forecast but also to a reversed result, as in the Portuguese referenda
example discussed above.
Our main research question is thus to understand how polls influence the final voting of
individuals and may also ultimately affect the abstention level and their own forecast ability.
The model answers to a non-trivial tradeoff faced by voters, namely how to take into account
this feedback effect stemming from incomplete information while reducing the risk of having
their stand misrepresented in the final voting result. Such strategic behavior leads some voters
to incur the cost of voting with an eye to the benefits of the final result. This model has an
additional appealing feature, namely the fact that it can be easily calibrated. Thus, it can be
used to forecast results and be appropriately tested in a comprehensive way, allowing analysts
to check their interpretation of surprising results.
Our paper provides an empirical application by calibrating the model for the above-mentioned
case of the abortion referendum in Portugal. We consider an election with an arbitrarily large
number of voters and two voting alternatives with a simple majority decision rule. Voting is not
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compulsory, and information about the voting topic is widespread as a result of public debates
and the agency of news media. Additionally, a sequence of public polls shows how the opinion
of the electorate regarding the issue at stake trends over time. The choice of this referendum
for our analysis is based on two reasons: first, the data were easily accessible, and second, and
more importantly, there have been two referenda on the same topic - which is a rare occurence.
This allowed for two different calibrations of the model, in the first referendum and the second
a few years later. By comparing the different parameters obtained from the two calibrations,
we may infer how the results affected the predisposition of voters to vote and abstain in the
second referendum. We are thus able to explain why the results of the first referendum were so
distant from forecasts and why the results of the second referendum confirmed all the forecasts,
corroborating much of the political analysts’ belief. As stressed above, our model builds on
two points: the incomplete flow of information provided by the sequence of polls and the social
interactions that may amplify the misreading of these polls, leading to erroneous forecasts. The
argument to build such a model must come from the understanding of how individuals, on the
basis of polls, update their decision on why and how to vote at all.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first finish this section with a brief
review of the literature. In the next section we lay out the model, followed by a section in which
the results are presented and their implications analyzed. We then calibrate a linearized version
of the model for the case of both abortion referenda in Portugal. The outcome of the calibration
is analyzed in light of the arguments raised by the political analysts, strongly validating them.
The last section presents our conclusions.
1.1 Literature review
The benchmark for a modern understanding of the issue why people vote is the seminal work
of Downs (1957). If there is a cost for voting and a virtually zero probability that one’s vote
is decisive, no individual would have an incentive to vote – and yet people continue to vote.
A more modern perspective suggests that people vote strategically, i.e. individuals decide why
and how to vote based on information about how other agents intend to vote, as mentioned in
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recent reviews such as Dhillon and Peralta (2002), Feddersen (2004), and Gheys (2006). This
is supported by empirical evidence reported in Cox (1997), Aldrich (1993), and Blais (2000,
2003), among others. Also a relatively recent literature (e.g. Klor and Winter, 2008, Grosser
and Schram, 2010, Knight and Schiff, 2010) provides empirical and experimental evidence of
the impact of polls in turnout and results of elections. By revealing updated information about
the winning likelihood of the different platforms, some candidates gain momentum and others
lose it, a mechanism that ends up giving much more comparative weight to the earliest polls
than to the last ones.
In order to solve the original voting issue, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) evolved from Downs’
(1957) and Tullock’s (1967) subsequent work to suggest a consumption benefit from voting that,
as pointed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), would assume away the voting paradox. In this
context, the decision to vote compares benefits and costs, taking into account the probability
of being pivotal. Ledyard (1981, 1984) introduced a game-theoretical approach, making this
probability endogenous, although ignoring voting costs. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985)
introduced costs in that game and concluded that when there is uncertainty about the actual
number of voters, high turnout equilibria would not exist, since the probability that a vote is
pivotal could be shown to be very small as the size of the voting population increases. Within
the game-theoretical approach, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) take an alternative
route trying to understand why voters could possibly abstain under costless voting, and find
that voters with strict preferences might abstain due to asymmetric information. This result
does not explain the non-voting paradox, but brings the critical role of information to the
decision-making process.
Another branch of the voting literature has focused on explaining the consumption premium
for voting, and converged to two classes of group-based models, the mobilization models and
the ethical voter models. The first assumes that voters are coordinated and rewarded by leaders
(Uhlaner, 1989; Morton, 1987 and 1991; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999, Herrera and Martinelli,
2006), while the latter assumes that individuals vote because they are motivated by altruistic
concerns for the welfare of others in their group of reference (Gooding and Roberts, 1975;
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Harsanyi, 1977 and 1992; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Markus, 1988; Coate and Conlin 2004;
Feddersen and Sandroni 2006). Such group-based models have found empirical support (e.g.
Schram, 1991 and 1992; Schram and Sonnenmans, 1996a,b; Hill and Leighley, 1996; Coate and
Conlin, 2004), but cannot ensure (except for some very particular examples) the existence of
equilibria or provide an endogenous mechanism that explains why an individual would join or
be identified with any specific group, as pointed out by Feddersen (2004).
2 Model
Our model combines the strategic view of voting behavior with the feedback impact and is also
based on a group-based reward, in the sense that we analyze aggregate behavioral outcomes
(election turnouts together with the choice of the winner) when the behavior of voters exhibits
social interaction effects. We follow the approach proposed by Brock and Durlauf (2001a, b)
for the case of large elections. Individuals’ utilities are composed of a private utility associated
with a choice and a social utility that reflects the desire to conform to others’ behavior in
a non-cooperative decision-making setting. What is distinctive in this approach is that an
individual’s choice is affected by the beliefs that the voter has about others’ intentions, as
inferred from the polls’ results. The social interaction component of this model is thus reflected
in the influence of the average of all the other voters’ attitudes, as expressed by the polls, on
one’s own voting attitude. The choice model is closed by imposing self-consistency between the
subjective beliefs and the objective probabilities conditional on the information made available
by the polls, implying rational expectations. Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) not only discuss the
existence and stability of multiple equilibria in this model, but also show that in the presence of
these conformity effects, the decentralized individual decision-making maximizes the aggregate
social welfare. All such results are extended to a multinomial setting in Brock and Durlauf
(2002, 2006), which is here suitably adapted and extended for the election model.
For a given information set, Brock and Durlauf’s approach provides the steady-state equi-
librium for the voting decision. However, as polls are disclosed over time, the information is
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updated and the voting attitude of each individual is revised taking into account not only his or
her private values, but also his or her desire to conform to others’ aggregate intended behavior.
The voting decision in our model is taken as a result of the tradeoff of these effects. We assume
that all voters’ attitudes are revised under the same updated information set and can prove
that the final result of the process will converge to one of several possible multiple equilibria.
The comparative statics of our model are consistent with well-known empirical facts. Under
complete information, the larger the lag between the proportion of favorable and unfavorable
voters, the more comfortable the voters for the winning position will be, and the less important
each of them will feel as a voter. The larger the announced gap, the less pivotal each voter
feels, and the more willing he or she is to change his or her voting attitudes to abstention. On
the contrary, the closer the gap in the polls, the less willing the voters are to abstain, since
each voter becomes more pivotal. We show that under incomplete information this discrepancy
between the forecast of the polls and the final results is aggravated, possibly inducing the type
of reversed observed outcomes.
2.1 Modeling individual choice with private social utility
The electorate is modeled as a system with a large number I of social agents, where each agent
i has to decide on a voting attitude to adopt ωi (e.g. ωi = 1 in favor, ωi = 2 to abstain, and
ωi = 3 against) by solving an individual utility maximization problem at some common time.
The space of all possible set of actions or decision outcomes taken by the population is the
N−tuple ω = (ω1, ...ωN). Also, ω−i = (ω1, ...ωi−1, ωi+1, ...ωN) denotes the set of the choices of
all other agents except for the agent i itself. The individual utility, Vi(ωi), follows the structure
proposed by Brock and Durlauf (2001a) and is assumed to consist of three components
Vi(ωi;µ
e
i , εi) = U(ωi) + S(ωi, µ
e
i ) + εi(ωi). (1)
The choice variable for agent i is the voting attitude ωi, which can take any value of the
suport set {1, 2, 3}, chosen by each individual so as to maximize the expected utility in (1)
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under the conditional probability measure µei . The term µ
e
i ≡ µei (ω−i) denotes the conditional
probability measure that agent i places on the choices of the others at the time of making his
or her decision. We shall denote by ω∗i the actual outcome of the decision process of agent i,
ω∗i = argmax Vi(ωi). The utility function of each agent takes into account not only individual
preferences expressed in the first term ui(ωi), but also information about the voting attitudes
of the other agents, expressed in the term Si(ωi, µ
e
i ) and obtained from the publicly available
results of polls, which generate µei . The term εi ≡ εi(ωi) is a random contribution to the
utility that is observable to each agent i but unobservable to the modeler, and accounts for the
heterogeneity of the different agents for each possible decision outcome ωi.
The voting attitudes are expressed as an overt behavior in two types of situations: when
agents reply to poll queries and when they actually vote. It is assumed that polling takes place
at an instant t prior to the decision process, which occurs at instant t+ 1, and that the public
announcement of the results of the polls drives the agents to reevaluate their existing voting
attitude. The outcome of the decision process is reflected only in later polls, say at instant t+2.
A difference in poll outcomes at instants t and t + 2 results from a reevaluation of individual
voting attitudes at t + 1, and so on. This describes a dynamic process in which the agents
change their voting attitude until the referendum day, when their decision becomes definite.
From a collective point of view, the state of the system is described by the fraction of
agents adopting the voting attitudes ωi = 1, 2, and 3, respectively ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3 - or in a
compact vector form ∆ ≡ (∆1,∆2,∆3). By far most agents have no direct access to information
about the state of the system except through the results of the polls. These may introduce some
distortion due not only to limitations in the sampling or polling methodologies, but also because
the media that publicize the results may not provide a complete analysis of that information.
For example, many media tend to focus on the relative percentage of agents in favor of or
against, and neglect the level of abstention. The results of the polls are designated by m1, m2,
and m3 - or in a compact vector form m ≡ (m1,m2,m3)-, corresponding to the frequencies of the
statistical classes used in the pools, and the result of which is made public. If the information
made available to the public about the results of the pools is incomplete, for example lacking
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the fraction associated with abstention, the corresponding value of m2 is null, implying that
this information has no impact on the decision of the agent. Under these considerations, the
dependence of the individual utility function Ui on µ
e
i is formally replaced by a dependency on
m, and it is thus possible to write
Vi(ωi) = U(ωi) + S(ωi,m) + εi(ωi). (2)
The first term denotes a deterministic private utility and is given by
U(ωi) =
3∑
α=1
uαδ(ωi, α) =

u1 if ωi = 1
u2 if ωi = 2
u3 if ωi = 3
,
thereby describing the individual preferences of each agent independently of the impact of
the results of the polls. The constants uα, with α = 1, 2 and 3, correspond to the expected
individual utility when the agent chooses the voting attitude α = ωi, ignoring the polls. Also,
the Kronecker delta is defined according to
δ(x, y) =

0 if x 6= y
1 if x = y
.
The second term of equation (2) denotes a deterministic social utility that models the
stategic rationality of the agent when confronted with the results of the polls m. This term is
given by
S(ωi,m) =
3∑
α=1
sα(m)δ(ωi, α) =

s1(m) if ωi = 1
s2(m) if ωi = 2
s3(m) if ωi = 3
,
thus describing the social interaction or pressure between agents mediated by the results of
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polls. The functions sα(m) with α = 1, 2, 3 describes how the expected utility of an agent
depends on the results of the polls if the agent adopts the attitude α = ωi. The deterministic
part of the utility function is
V̄ (ωi,m) = U(ωi) + S(ωi,m) (3)
and can be written in a more compact and useful way as
V̄ (ωi,m) =
3∑
α=1
fα(m)δ(ωi, α) =

s1(m) + u1 if ωi = 1
s2(m) + u2 if ωi = 2
s3(m) + u3 if ωi = 3
(4)
where fα(m) ≡ sα(m) + uα is the utility specific for each potential voting decision α.
The third term in equation (2) εi(ωi) denotes a random private utility, which is different for
each agent, thus modeling agent heterogeneity, and has the following structure
εi(ωi) =
3∑
α=1
εi,αδ[ωi, α] =

εi,1 if ωi = 1
εi,2 if ωi = 2
εi,3 if ωi = 3
,
where εi,α (with α = 1, 2, and 3) are random independent variables, not necessarily equaly
distributed, the realizations of which may depend on the potential adopted attitude ωi.
Hence, the complete individual utility function becomes
V t+1i (ωi,m
t) =
3∑
α=1
[
fα(m
t) + εi,α
]
δ[ωi, α] =

f1(m) + εi,1 if ωi = 1
f2(m) + εi,2 if ωi = 2
f3(m) + εi,3 if ωi = 3
(5)
where the superscripts t and t+ 1 are introduced to indicate at which instant of the dynamics
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each quantity should be evaluated.
Each agent i chooses the alternative ω∗i that provides his or her maximum utility, say
ω∗t+1i = argmax
ωi=1,2,3
V t+1i (ωi,m
t).
Given that the individual utility function has a random component εi, one may only compute
the probability of each agent adopting an attitude ω∗i = ωi, say
P (ω∗t+1i = ωi) = P [V
t+1
i (ω
∗
i ,m
t) ≥ V t+1i (ωi,mt),∀ωi = 1, 2, 3].
2.2 Pure herding effect
Consider the process of individual decision-making within a group, leading to a possibly different
behavior for each member. We characterize a herd when the majority of the resulting behaviors
are largely alligned, in spite of possible different personal preferences. In such a case individuals
in the group act together without any planned direction, presenting a collective, relatively
homogeneous, behavior. In the context of our decision-making model we would say that herd
behavior occurs when the peer pressure described by the social utility part of equation (2) is
greater than the private preferences as described by the first term. In this section we consider
that the social utility component will reflect the gain of utility for an individual by agreeing
with the choice of the other elements in the group.
In order to capture the herding effect, an increase of the utility of voting for a given alterna-
tive α must follow as the polls reveal a larger fraction of voters in that same alternative α. In
other words, the function fα must be an increasing function of the fraction mα of agents assu-
med to adopt the position α. For simplicity, the social interaction utility component describing
the herding effect shα(m
t) is assumed to be linear, say
shα(m) = aααmα, (6)
where aαα are some positive constant parameters to guarantee the increasing behavior. Then,
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it follows that fhα(m) = aααmα + uα and that
Vi(ωi,m) =
3∑
α=1
[aααmα + uα + εi,α] δ(ωi, α). (7)
2.3 Cross-herding effect
We now lead on to a more sophisticated version of the herding effect than the one considered
above. Here we will consider that the decision of each agent is not only reinforced by the
number of agents that agree with him or her, but also can be affected by the foreseen level of
abstention. For example, agents who might prefer to abstain in the absence of the polls can be
driven to conform to the winning side once the polls are public, thus reinforcing that position.
This can also be captured by adopting a linear social interaction utility component, but now
with a more complex structure, say
shα(m) =
3∑
β=1
aαβmβ, (8)
where the diagonal terms aαα (i.e. with α = β) correspond to the pure herding effect described
in the previous section, and the off-diagonal terms aαβ (with α 6= β) describe the social pressure
between different voting attitudes, denoted here as a cross-herding effect. In this case the value
of aαβ can be interpreted as the marginal increase in utility for an agent willing to vote for
alternative α if he or she aligns with voting for alternative β, reflecting a strategic voting
behavior. The matrix a can thus be seen as a payoff matrix, leading each player to adopt a
voting strategy that considers the aggregate decision of all other players. In this sense the
herding effect with aαα > aαβ for α 6= β can be understood as a coordination game.
It now follows that fhα(m) =
∑3
β=1 aαβmβ + uα and
Vi(ωi,m) =
3∑
α=1
[
3∑
β=1
aαβmβ + uα + εi,α
]
δ(ωi, α). (9)
The interesting aspects of the cross-herding is that the levels of abstention can impact
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differently on the sides of the “yes” and of the “no”, caused by an asymmetry in the parameters
a12 and a23 (or a21 and a32). As a consequence, one of the voting sides (“yes” or “no”) can drag
more undecided voters to their stand than the other, thus affecting the outcome of the polls
and of the voting process.
2.4 From individual decisions to polls
The public information resulting from the polls at time t is described by the vector mt =
(mt1,m
t
2,m
t
3) and is obtained by sampling the voting attitudes ∆
t−1 = (∆t−11 ,∆
t−1
2 ,∆
t−1
3 ) from
the population at time t− 1. In a formal way, this is sumarized by
mt = R
(
∆t−1
)
, (10)
where R is a function that describes how the information about the populations is sampled
and converted into the public information made available to the voters, assumed to be a good
estimator of µe(ω−i). If this information is fully detailed about the state of the system, then it
is possible to estimate the vector ∆ ≡
[
∆t−11 ,∆
t−1
2 ,∆
t−1
3
]
by mt, say
mt = Rc
(
∆t−1
)
≈
[
∆t−11 ,∆
t−1
2 ,∆
t−1
3
]
, (11)
except for an estimation error.
However, if the public ignores the abstention level in their decision process because, for
example, the media only publicize the percentage of voters in favor and against, then
mt = Ri
(
∆t−1
)
≈
[
∆t−11 , 0,∆
t−1
3
]
. (12)
This would make the contribution of the abstention level to the individual utility equal to zero.
Another possible scenario occurs when the public is informed of the percentage of votes in
favor and against corrected to the participation level of voters ∆1 + ∆2. The function R would
then be
14
Ri∗
(
∆t−1
)
=
[
∆t−11
∆t−11 + ∆
t−1
3
, 0,
∆t−13
∆t−11 + ∆
t−1
3
]
. (13)
Introducing equation (10) into the definition of the deterministic component V̄ of the indi-
vidual utility function yields that
V̄ (ωi,m
t) =
3∑
α=1
gα
(
∆t−1
)
δ[ωi, α] (14)
where gα ≡ fα ◦R1.
2.5 Formal solution of the utility maximization problem
Combining equations (10) and (9), and using the solution method described in appendix A,
produces a relationship between the consecutive fractions of agents at instants t− 1 and t+ 1
∆t+11 =
eβg1(∆
t−1)
eβg1(∆t−1) + eβg2(∆t−1) + eβg3(∆t−1)
(15)
∆t+12 =
eβg2(∆
t−1)
eβg1(∆t−1) + eβg2(∆t−1) + eβg3(∆t−1)
(16)
∆t+13 =
eβg3(∆
t−1)
eβg1(∆t−1) + eβg2(∆t−1) + eβg3(∆t−1)
(17)
which can be written in a formal and compact way as
∆t+1α = Fα
(
∆t−1
)
, with α = 1, 2 and 3,
where Fα is defined by the right side of equations (15) to (17).
The Brouwer fixed point theorem (Brouwer, 1911) guarantees that this iteration process, in
which the results of newer polls drive voters, converges to a fixed configuration of the system.
This final configuration is an atractive fixed point of the discrete map transformation Fα,
1The symbol ◦ represents the function composition which is the application of one function (in this case fα)
to the results of another (in this case R).
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defined as
∆∗α = Fα (∆∗) . (18)
The Brouwer theorem also guarantees the existence of at least one fixed point but allows for
more than one.
The populations for each voting attitude α satisfy the condition ∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3 = 1, which
allows writing the aggregate state of the system in terms of the participation level p = 1−∆2
and the polarization of opinion s = ∆1−∆3. Equation (18) can be rewritten in terms of p and
s as
st+1 = F1(∆t−1)−F3(∆t−1) (19)
pt+1 = 1−F2(∆t−1). (20)
Equations (19) and (20) can be transformed into
st+2 = pt+2tanh[χ(st, pt)] (21)
pt+2 =
cosh[χ(st, pt)]
cosh[χ(st, pt)] + 1/2exp[ν(st, pt)]
(22)
with χ(s, p) ≡ 1/2 [g1 − g3], ν(s, p) ≡ g2 − 1/2[g1 + g3] and gα ≡ gα (mt+1). It is convenient to
define the polarization of opinion adjusted to the level of participation as σt+2 ≡ st+2/pt+2.
Then, equations (21) and (22) can be written as
σt+2 = tanh[χ̃(σt, pt)] (23)
pt+2 =
cosh[χ̃(σt, pt)]
cosh[χ̃(σt, pt)] + 1/2exp[χ̃(σt, pt)]
(24)
where χ̃(σ, p) ≡ χ(s.p, p) and ν̃(σ, p) ≡ ν(s.p, p) should be considered as functions of σ and p,
only. Notice that when the agents cannot abstain and choose only between voting in favor or
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against, the level of participation is fixed to 1 (i.e. pt+2 = pt = 1) and equation (21) reduces to
st+2 = tanh[χ(st, 1)], (25)
which coincides with the expression obtained by Brock and Durlauf (2001a, 2001b) for a model
with binary choice.
3 Results
In this section we characterize the types of fixed points of the system, as expressed in equation
(18). This will characterize the outcome of the referendum according to our model. In a first
step we consider only the case of herding effect in which information is complete and agents
have access to the full results of the polls. In this case, R is given by the identity matrix as in
equation (11). We next consider the case in which information is incomplete and agents ignore
the abstention level. In this case R is given by equation (12). Finally, we address the case in
which multiple outcomes are possible in each of the of the information settings described. In
this case the usefulness of polls to forescast the referendum outcome is unclear.
3.1 Complete information
We consider the following model for the matrix aαβ in equation (8), reflecting the utilities for
the different voting attitudes in the case of complete information:
aαβ =

j q 0
q k r
0 r j
 , (26)
where j is the utility if voters agree to vote in favor or against (since the herding effect should
be equally strong in both directions), and k is the utility if voters agree to abstain. Parameters
q and r are utilities that reflect the impact of the abstention level in the decision of agents to
vote in favor or against, respectively.
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The public information resulting from the polls is given by mtβ as in equation (10), which
can be obtained from the actual populations of agents according to mtβ =
∑
γ Rβγ∆
t−1
γ , where
R is the identity matrix. As a result, for complete information the utility function is simply
V̄ (ωi) =
3∑
α=1
[
3∑
β=1
aαβ∆
t−1
β + uα
]
δ(ωi, α).
The outcome of the referendum, expressed as the percentage of the total number of valid votes
that were in favor and against, is
%favor =
p+ s
2p
=
1
2
(1 + σ)
%against =
p− s
2p
=
1
2
(1− σ).
In Figure 3 we present an illustration of the stationary configurations of the system obtained
as the overlap of the solution of equation (19) (drawn in red) and equation (20) (drawn in blue)
for j = 2.0, k = 3.0, q = 0.0, and r = 1.0. In this situation there are different attitudes toward
abstention. Voters in favor are indifferent to abstention (q = 0.0), whereas voters against are
sensitive to the level of abstention (r = 1.0).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
From this figure, the fixed points resulting from this dynamic process are s = −0.10 and
p = 0.32, corresponding to 11% of votes in favor versus 21% against and an abstention level of
68%. This outcome translates into 34% of valid votes in favor and 66% against.
3.2 Incomplete information
We now consider the same model for the case of incomplete information with the same matrix
aαβ as above but with
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R =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
 .
Following equation (14), this results in a matrix ãαβ
ãαβ =

j 0 0
q 0 r
0 0 j
 , (27)
which produces the same utility function as a complete information model with an adjusted
matrix aαβ given by
aαβ =

j q/2 0
q/2 0 r/2
0 r/2 j
 . (28)
Using the participation level p = 1−∆2 and the polarization of opinion s = ∆1−∆3, we present
an illustration of the stationary configurations of the system obtained for the same values of
the parameters j = 2.0, k = 3.0, q = 0.0, and r = 1.0 as those used in the example above of
complete information.
Under these conditions we have s = 0.23 and p = 0.82. As a result, the outcome translates
into 64% in favor and 36% against, with a level of abstention of 18%. Comparing the results in
Figures 3 and 4, we notice that under incomplete information there is a radical reduction of the
abstention level (from 68% to 18%) as compared to the case of complete information, together
with a change of the referendum result, from a rejection to an approval of the issue at stake.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
3.3 Multiple outcomes
In the examples above we have considered that there is only one stationary configuration of
the system, i.e. a single pair (s,p) such that both equations (19) and (20) are simultaneously
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satisfied. We now consider the case in which the parameters of the model are such that more
of one pair can simultaneously satisfy both equations. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where on
the left side we have cases of one single solution and on the right side the chosen parameters
lead to three possible solutions.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
There are two features that we analyze in the Figure 5 graphs: i) the break of symmetry
(visible in the change from the first to the second line); ii) the increase in the number of solutions
(visible in the change from the left to the right side).
In the first feature, the two figures in the top line are perfectly symmetrical. The change to
the bottom line breaks the symmetry of the solutions. From the point of view of the parameters,
q is different from r in the bottom line, reflecting different predispositions toward abstention
between the two different groups. This means that one of the stands in the referendum provides
a stronger motivation to vote - or to fight abstention - than the other stand. If we take the left
column, we can see that this asymmetry favors one of the outcomes, namely the position of the
group that is more mobilized to vote.
While the cases on the left side are similar to the examples given in the earlier sections, the
multiple solution cases deserve some additional attention. We notice that in the transition from
the left to the right column the value of j increases. This indicates that the social interaction
- and thus the peer pressure - within each stand is stronger in the right side, making it more
difficult for people to change opinion after repeated interactions. In other words, a high value
of j implies that groups that succeed in attracting undecided voters are more likely to keep
them, as compared to the case where j is low. This leads to a stable solution of the system, i.e.
a solution in which most voters are strongly commited and the probability of changing their
minds is very low. For that reason, such solutions are termed stable. The fastest growing group
in this process will eventually gain the advantage in the referendum process. As we cannot
ex-ante identify which group will achieve this leading position, the model yields both of the
stable outcomes that are possible: one in which the position in favor wins and another in which
the position in favor loses.
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We also notice that in the cases corresponding to the right column of Figure 5 there is a
third intermediate solution yielding a close match between the number of voters against and in
favor. This basically corresponds to a tie or, more precisely, a state of indecision in which the
system has not achieved a stable solution. In such a situation, a few people changing opinion
may easily swing the solution to either one of the stable solutions. Even though this solution
satisfies equations (19) and (20), and is a fixed point of the dynamics, it is unstable and very
difficult to identify in real terms (see Figure 6).
[Insert Figure 6 here]
4 Calibration of the model
We now turn to an essential contribution of this approach. The issue we address here is to
understand how the data gained from polls can be used to tell us something about the system
that, in turn, will allow us to forecast the final result of the referendum with a satisfactory
degree of accuracy. In other words, we would like to know the extent to which the sequence of
poll data will allow us to correctly calibrate the model, determining the values of the parameters
including the matrix a of interaction between voters and their individual preferences h.
Applying this procedure to the particular case of the abortion referendum in Portugal (1998),
we will consider a matrix
aαβ =

j+ q 0
q k r
0 r j−

where we use two different parameters j: j+ for the social pressure among voters in favor, and
j− for the social pressure among voters against. For simplicity, we assume a generating function
G(y1, y2, ...) of the form
G(y1, y2, y3) = y1 + y2 + y3.
The data for the polls publicized for the 1998 referendum were obtained from Magalhães
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(1998), being careful not to include the results of the final referendum voting. We used non-
linear minimum least square fitting to obtain
β × aαβ = 5.62×

8.28× 10−2 2.34× 10−1 0
2.34× 10−1 4.58× 10−7 −6.65× 10−1
0 −6.65× 10−1 2.07× 10−8

β × hα = 5.62×

8.81× 10−3
−2.28× 10−1
2.15× 10−2

We notice several interesting things in this matrix.
First, the value of k is zero, meaning that the system behaves as if information were in-
complete, in the sense that no emphasis was given in the media to the (declared) abstention
level.
Second, the value of q is positive while the value of r is negative. This shows that voters
against abortion were much more mobilized to vote than sympathizers of abortion legalization.
This difference in mobilization actually could explain that most of the few final voters were
against abortion, contradicting the polls. This is consistent with much of the subsequent ana-
lysis in the press at that time, which sought to explain the surprising result of the referendum.
We should also analyze the diagonal elements j+ and j−. Notice that the former is positive
and the latter is zero for all practical purposes. Recalling that these numbers express the intra-
group social pressure, we might expect that this simply reflects the fact that the arguments
conditioning the attitudes of those in favor were strongly induced by social pressure. For
those against, the arguments were clearly more of an idyosincratic nature, based on personal
convictions that did not require reinforcement of social pressure.
As described in the introduction, the referendum was repeated in 2007. The fitting of the
results of the polls preceding the second referendum (Magalhães, 2007), yielded
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β × aαβ = 1.58×

4.97× 10−1 −3.56× 10−1 0
−3.56× 10−1 1.44× 10−8 −5.00× 10−1
0 −5.00× 10−1 3.37× 10−8
 .
β × hα = 1.58×

3.08× 10−2
−2.83× 10−1
1.05× 10−2

In light of the above analysis, it is clear what happened in this second referendum. In
qualitative terms the only change in the matrix is that the value of q is now negative. This
simply means that the group in favor changed their attitude toward abstention, becoming much
more active in mobilizing people to vote. This is consistent with the explanation advanced by
the analysts following the first referendum, that the outcome contradicting the polls resulted
from a low mobilization of the majority of voters, namely those in favor.
5 Static and dynamic analysis
We now provide some comparative statics of the solution of the model matrix, say
β × aαβ =

j+ q 0
q 0 r
0 r 0
 . (29)
Notice that in this matrix the values of k and j− have been set to zero in acordance with the
results of the calibration described in the previous section. For this situation the functions in
equations (23) and (24) become
χ̃(σ, p) =
1
4
j+p(σ + 1) +
1
2
Γ(1− p) (30)
ν̃(σ, p) =
1
4
j+p(σ + 1) +
1
2
Λ(1− p) (31)
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where Γ ≡ (q − r)/2 and Λ ≡ (q + r)/2 denote respectively the asymmetry and average in the
cross-herding power toward abstention between voters against and in favor.
Consider first how small changes of the polarization of opinion δσt and of the voter partici-
pation δpt at instant t produce variation of the voters’ decision at instant t + 2, namely δσt+2
and δpt+2:
δσt+2 =
[
1−
(
σt+2
)2] 1
4
j+p
tδσt +
[
1−
(
σt+2
)2] [1
4
j+(σ
t + 1)− Γ
]
δpt (32)
δpt+2 = pt+2
[
1− pt+2
] [1
4
j+(σ
t+2 + 1)− Γ
]
ptδσt +
+
1
4
pt+2
[
1− pt+2
] [
j+(σ
t+2 + 1)(σt + 1)− Γ(σt+2 + σt)− 2Λ
]
δpt (33)
In the neighborhood of each fixed point, the variation of the results of polls becomes small, and
it then follows that δσt+2 ≈ σt+2 − σt, δpt+2 ≈ pt+2 − pt, σ ≈ σt+2 ≈ σt and p ≈ pt+2 ≈ pt.
The feedback effect for σ between instants t and t+ 2 is given by
δσt+2 =
[
1− σ2
] 1
4
j+p δσ
t (34)
and is always positive (δσt > 0 implies that δσt+2 > 0), indicating a herding effect that reinforces
the results of the previous polls. On the other hand, the feedback effect for p between instants
t and t+ 2 is given by
δpt+2 =
1
4
p [1− p]
[
j+(σ + 1)
2 − 2Γσ − 2Λ
]
δpt. (35)
The analysis of this feedback does not have a well-defined signal, being positive for j+(σ+1)
2−
2Γσ − 2Λ > 0 and negative for j+(σ + 1)2 − 2Γσ − 2Λ < 0 . To explain the meaning of the
change of sign of δpt+2 assume for simplicity that Γ is positive and large (Γ/j+ > 2) and Λ = 0.
In other words, Γ > 0 means that the voters in favor have a strong cross-herding inducement
toward abstention. As a result, when σ is negative or positive but small and voters in favor
are not likely to win, or there is a close match in the results, they then tend to abstain less
and support their stand resulting in a positive feedback (δpt+2/δpt > 0). However, as σ gets
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close to 1, and it is foreseen that the stand in favor is going to win with a large majority, some
of these voters will tend to abstain, resulting in a negative feedback (δpt+2/δpt < 0). These
negative feedbacks are very interesting dynamically because they entail that the variations of
participation will change sign in two consecutive polls, meaning that the participation level
fluctuates (decreasing after increasing and vice-versa). This latter result can be interpreted as
a reaction to a decrease in the perceived pivotal power of voters both in favor and against. For
0 < Γ/j+ < 2 the effect of cross-herding toward abstention of the voters in favor is not strong
enough to switch the sign of the feedback for large σ but only a decrease amplitude of δpt+2/δpt.
For negative Γ/j+ the cross-herding power is stronger for voters against and now occurs the
symmetrical case, where for large negative σ the participation fluctuates and for weakly and
positive σ there is always a positive feedback.
The impact of the level of participation in the polarization or gap σ between voting attitudes
w = 1 and w = 3 is obtained from
δσt+2 =
[
1− σ2
] [1
4
j+(σ + 1)− Γ
]
δpt. (36)
In the absence of asymmetry toward abstention between voter in favor and against (Γ = 0),
increases in participation level p tend to amplify the gap g and therefore the trend of the polls
at t are reinforced at t + 2. When an asymmetry is introduced (Γ 6= 0) this amplification can
be either increased (Γ < 0) or decreased (Γ > 0), and even inverted (Γ > 1
4
j+(σ + 1)).
The level of participation p is affected by the gap g according to
δpt+2 = p2(1− p)
[
1
4
j+(σ + 1)− Γ
]
p δσt. (37)
Notice that the sign of this feedback is identical to the previous expressions. As before, in
the absence os an asymmetric cross-herding (Γ = 0), an increase in voter polarization toward
the voting option exhibiting pure herding (w = 1) promotes voter participation. However,
an inversion of the polarization (σ < 0) tends to decrease voter participation because w = 2
presents no herding effect. Again, the effect of Γ 6= 0 is to distort the pure herding effect on
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the participation level.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we propose an explanation for differences between the polls projections and the
final outcome of referenda. Our model implies that there is a dynamic feedback between the
results of polls and individual voting attitudes. This process can be affected by the way results
of polls are presented to the public in the media and, ultimately, by the way they are perceived
by voters. Dissonances between individual perception and aggregate voting trends can be
amplified by the feedback process, resulting in a strong discrepancy between the results of polls
and the actual voting outcome.
One such dissonance can occur when individuals within each of the voting groups have
different predispositions toward abstention. This bias may not be explicit in the results of the
polls as divulged by the media, which are more focused on the number of voting intentions in
favor and against. Individuals are then not able to correctly anticipate the behavior of others
in elections, and adjust their voting attitude accordingly. This can favor smaller voting groups
with larger aversion toward abstention and eventually switch the outcome of the referendum
from the polls’ predictions.
From the dynamic point of view, we have shown that this model always has at least one
attractive fixed point at which the number of individuals adopting each voting attitude is stable.
The results of successive polls drive the aggregate voting attitudes and asymptotically converge
to the attractive fixed point.
Under certain conditions, the model can have more than one fixed point, and it is then
impossible to determine ex-ante the fixed point towards which the aggregate voting attitudes
will converge. This can further frustrate polls in forecasting the outcome of referenda.
To illustrate the application of real data to this model, we considered the case of the two
abortion referenda in Portugal that occurred in 1998 and 2007. In 1998 the stand against the
proposition in the referendum had the highest numbers of votes despite the fact that all the polls
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had pointed strongly in the opposite direction. At the time, many political analysts justified
this discrepancy with a stronger predisposition to vote among individuals against the issue.
The debate following the results of this referendum increased the social pressure for voters in
favor not to abstain in the second referendum. Also, there was a more intense discussion of the
impact of level of abstention in the voting results. In the voting results of 2007 the stand in
favor had the largest number of votes, thus confirming the original polls.
Using the results of the polls in the run-up to each referendum, it is possible to calibrate the
model incorporating cross-herding effects. For the parameters characterizing such effects, it was
found that their values were consistent with the above-mentioned interpretation of the results.
In particular, the calibration of the model provides evidence that voters in favor reduced their
predisposition toward abstention following the 1998 results, leading to greater participation in
the 2007 referendum.
Our model is sufficiently general to encompass the pivotal effect, i.e., the explanation that
an individual may be led to vote in spite of the costs to do so, because there is a chance that
his or her vote may be decisive. Since it has been argued in the literature that this effect is
negligeable in both theoretical and empirical terms, we chose not to include this (rather simple)
extension herein. However, our findings will be provided to the interested reader upon request.
With suitable adaptations the model presented here can be applied to other types of voting
processes, namely elections. As discussed above, there are two main differences. The most
obvious change would be that the number of voting choices would be greater than two. A
second more subtle issue is that the choice process in regular elections is a repeated game
recurring every four years - and not the one-shot election that a referendum usually is. In other
words, on the basis of the choice in a regular election (local, state, or national) there are factors
such as the past performance of the incumbent to be taken into account, leading to a different
inter-temporal utility structure that we did not touch upon. This model stresses the dynamic
and collective nature of the voting decision process and the implications of the completeness
of information available to the public in the outcome of that decision. These factors allow for
feedback loops between voters that can amplify trends and produce results that can be quite
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different from the poll forecast.
Figures
Figure 1: Results of the opinion polls leading up to the 1998 national referendum on abortion
in Portugal. Source: http://margensdeerro.blogspot.com
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Figure 2: Results of the opinion polls leading up to the 2007 national referendum on abortion
in Portugal. Source: http://margensdeerro.blogspot.com
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Figure 3: Graphic determination of the stationary configuration of a social system of voters as
solutions of equations (19) (drawn in red) and (20) (drawn in blue), for parameters j = 2.0,
k = 3.0, q = 0.0, r = 1.0, and h ≡ [h1, h2, h3] = [0.2, 0., 0.0].
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Figure 4: Graphical determination of the stationary configuration of a social system of voters
as solutions of equations (19) (drawn in red) and (20) (drawn in blue), for parameters j = 2.0,
k = 3.0, q = 0.0. r = 1.0, and h ≡ [h1, h2, h3] = [0.2, 0., 0.0].
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Figure 5: Graphic determination of the stationary configuration of a social system of voters
as solutions of equations (19) (drawn in red) and (20) (drawn in blue), for different set of
parameters. It is shown that for several primitives, the system can present one (on the left) or
multiple (on the right) stationary points. In the case of multiple stationary points, they are not
all necessarily attractive. In the cases presented only the two most outer points are attractive.
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Figure 6: Graphic determination of the stationary configuration of a social syste of voters as
solutions of equations (19) (drawn in red) and (20) (drawn in blue), in a case with multiple
stationary points. The arrows connect two consecutive configurations according to the dynamics
of the system. On top we present amplifications of the graph in the proximity of each of the
stationary points. It is shown that the two outer stationary points are stable while the central
one is unstable.
Appendix A
McFadden (1978, 1981) developed a method for solving the maximization problem
ω∗t+1i = argmax
ωi=1,2,3
V t+1i (ωi,m
t) (38)
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in a wide class of situations. His approach begins by considering that the random term of the
individual utility function εi,α follows a frequency distribution obtained from generating function
G ≡ G(y1, y2, ...). The function G is assumed to be a non-negative homogenous function of
degree d > 0 defined on the orthant yα ≥ 0, which diverges without bound. The kth cross
partial derivatives of G are non-negative when k is odd and non-positive when k is even. The
valid multivariate distribution function generated by G is
FG = exp[−G(y1, y2, ...)]. (39)
McFadden (1978, 1981) showed that if εi,α jointly follows this type of multivariate generalized
extreme value with generating functionG, the probability P (ω∗t+1i = ωi) can be derived in closed
form as
P (ωi = 1) =
y1G1(y1, y2, ...)
G(y1, y2, ...)
,
P (ωi = 2) =
y2G2(y1, y2, ...)
G(y1, y2, ...)
,
P (ωi = 3) =
y3G3(y1, y2, ...)
G(y1, y2, ...)
,
with yα = exp[βf
t
α], Gα = ∂G/∂yα, and β some scalar parameter. A more recent formulation
of these results can be found in Misra (2005).
It is convenient to distinguish between individual quantities refering to a particular agent
i, say Xi ≡ Xi(ωi), which depend on the state of the agent alone, and global quantities X ≡∑N
i=1 piXi, which aggregate individual quantities of all the agents according to some weights
pi.
The average value of Xi over the probability distribution P (ωi) for an individual i is defined
as the quantity
〈Xi〉 =
3∑
α=1
Xi(α)P (α),
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and can be calculated using an aternative expression obtained by construction as
〈Xi〉 =
∂ln G
∂Y
∣∣∣∣
Y=0
=
3∑
α=1
Xi(α)e
Xi(α)Y
yαGα
G
∣∣∣∣∣
Y=0
=
3∑
α=1
Xi(α)
yαGα
G
=
3∑
α=1
Xi(α)P (α)
Following the same approach, the variance of Xi is
var(Xi) ≡
〈
X2i
〉
− 〈Xi〉2 =
∂2ln G
∂Y 2
∣∣∣∣
Y=0
.
Also, the mean value of global quantities X can be computed by
〈X〉 = ∂ln G
∂Y
∣∣∣∣
Y=0
=
N∑
i=1
pi
[
3∑
α=1
Xi(α)
yαGα
G
]
.
In particular, the value of 〈∆〉 can be calculated using the fact that ∆t+1α = N−1
∑N
i=1 δ(ωi, α)
(i.e. with pi = 1/N and Xi = δ(ωi, α) ). Then
〈
∆t+1α
〉
=
N∑
i=1
pi
[
3∑
β=1
Xi(α)
yαGα
G
]
=
N∑
i=1
[
3∑
α=1
δ[α, ωi]
yαGα
G
]
=
yωGω
G
. (40)
In the right side of equation (40) there is an implicit functional dependence of 〈∆t+1w 〉 in the
results of polls obtained at t via yα = exp[βfα (m
t)] = exp[βgα(∆
t−1)].
This dependence can be expressed in a formal way as
〈
∆t+1α
〉
= Fα(mt) (41)
with Fα(mt) ≡ yαGα/G. To simplify notation, the average brackets 〈〉are omited elsewhere in
this article.
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